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Legal Consciousness Reconsidered
Lynette J. Chua* and David M. Engel**
Abstract
Legal consciousness is a vibrant research field attracting growing numbers of scholars
worldwide. Yet differing assumptions about aims and methods have generated
vigorous debate, typically resulting from a failure to recognize that three different
clusters of scholars—identified here as the Identity, Hegemony, and Mobilization
schools—are pursuing different goals and deploying the concept of legal consciousness
in different ways. Scholarship associated with these three schools demonstrates that
legal consciousness is actually a flexible paradigm with multiple applications rather
than a monolithic approach. Furthermore, a new generation of scholars has energized
the field in recent years, focusing on marginalized peoples and non-Western settings.
Through their findings, and as a result of broader trends across the social sciences,
relational legal consciousness has taken on greater importance. Legal consciousness
research should be imagined on a continuum ranging from individualistic
conceptualizations of thought and action to interactive, co-constitutive approaches.
INTRODUCTION
For more than a century, sociolegal scholars have sought to explain when and how law becomes
active in social life. Not content to analyze the claims brought by legal professionals in official
forums, these researchers have looked beyond the courthouse and even the lawyer’s office. They
have found that law tends to insinuate itself into the cracks and crevices of daily routines, and its
direct and indirect influence can be detected in the most mundane and seemingly nonlegal
interactions of everyday life. A central finding of sociolegal research from its earliest days to the
present has been the impossibility of separating the social or cultural from the legal, so strong is
their bond.
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Given this long-standing fascination with the relationship between law and quotidian social
practices, the question remains how the law–culture–society nexus should best be studied. What
theories and methods are most suited to explore these interactive effects? There has been
extraordinary diversity in our field on these matters. In some respects, the story is one of
“restless searching” for new and better research paradigms (Munger 1998).
One of the most prominent paradigms today is that of legal consciousness, which emerged in
the early 1980s and has since been adopted by growing numbers of researchers. This article
traces the development of legal consciousness research over nearly four decades and suggests a
promising direction that future scholars may follow. It starts with definitions and applications by
sociolegal scholars whose differing objectives have led to three distinctive schools of research. It
then examines a period of turbulence and self-reflection among legal consciousness scholars at
the turn of the twenty-first century and a period of exuberant expansion in the years that
followed. The remainder of the article identifies relational legal consciousness as an important
trend for future sociolegal research.

FOUNDATIONS
Defining Legal Consciousness
Different scholars have adopted dissimilar approaches to research on legal consciousness and
have proposed a plethora of definitions (see, e.g., Albiston 2006, Ewick & Silbey 1998, McCann
1994, Merry 1990, Nielsen 2000). We begin by offering our own. In this article, legal
consciousness refers to the ways in which people experience, understand, and act in relation to
law. It comprises both cognition and behavior, both the ideologies and the practices of people as
they navigate their way through situations in which law could play a role. Legal consciousness
does not simply refer to legal awareness, nor is it meant to measure knowledge—or ignorance—
of the law. Indeed, some legal consciousness research demonstrates the extent to which people
do not invoke or think about the law at all—or perceive it to be irrelevant. Often enough legal
consciousness research documents the absence as well as the presence of law in people’s
understanding of the social world and their place in it. Like the Cheshire Cat, law appears and
disappears in the picture of everyday life drawn by legal consciousness researchers.
According to our definition, and consistent with most of the literature on the topic, three
elements of subjectivity are of primary interest to legal consciousness scholars, regardless of
2

their research methods or theoretical orientation: worldview, perception, and decision. None of
these three elements is given; all emerge in distinctive ways from social interactions, and all are
interconnected.
Worldview. Worldview refers to individuals’ understanding of their society, their place in it,
their positions relative to others, and, accordingly, the manner in which they should perform
social interactions. Worldview manifests in individuals’ constructions of self or identity, and it
plays out in their relationships with other people, groups, and institutions, as well as the natural
and spiritual worlds in which they live. It emerges from their prior experiences, and it influences
how they perceive and respond to new experiences—and whether they should mobilize the law.
Perception. Perception refers to individuals’ interpretation of specific events. People may, for
example, perceive a new event as normal, problematic, harmful, or wrong. For individuals who
perceive an event as unexceptional, law may seem immaterial; for those who perceive the same
event as violative of interests or rights, law may seem significant. With experience, of course,
one’s perceptions of events can change. For example, an encounter with an activist or lawyer
may shift an individual’s perception toward legal rights.
Decision. Decision refers to individuals’ responses to events and typically reflects both their
worldview and perception. Decisions may at times involve deliberate choices to use the law but
at other times to leave it dormant. A decision and its outcome form a new experience that can
reconstitute the individual’s worldview and perceptions for the future.
The attention legal consciousness researchers began to give issues of worldview, perception,
and decision in the 1980s reflected a broad shift in sociolegal scholarship toward the study of
subjectivity in law, particularly among lay actors. What Seron & Silbey (2004) have described as
sociolegal scholarship’s “cultural” turn was in fact part of a trend in contemporary social theory
toward cognition and social construction (Albiston 2006). It is from these developments that
legal consciousness research emerged, as well as from earlier sociolegal research on legal
culture, legal pluralism, and dispute processing. Despite these commonalities in the evolution of
legal consciousness research, however, there was no unanimity concerning theories or methods
in the field. We turn next to the differing ways in which sociolegal scholars have framed their
explorations of legal consciousness issues.
Three Schools of Legal Consciousness Research
3

As legal consciousness research gathered momentum in the mid-1980s and proliferated in the
late twentieth century, it became apparent that researchers were approaching their work in
divergent ways, leading to the emergence of three schools, which we call Identity, Hegemony,
and Mobilization. Whether the scholars whose work we assign to these three schools would
accept our classification remains to be seen. In fact, the lines are not always bright and clear. The
work of some scholars draws on more than one school of thought, and research in all three
schools tends to overlap and interact in synergistic ways. Yet the differences among the three
schools are not trivial, and the failure to recognize their divergent aims and assumptions has
generated a degree of confusion and even conflict—unnecessarily so, in our view, because the
goals being pursued are simply not the same. In this section, we explain these differences and
highlight how each school engages with the three constitutive elements of legal consciousness
discussed above—worldview, perception, and decision making.
Identity.
The Identity school treats individual subjectivity in relation to law as the explanandum—the
phenomenon demanding critical investigation and analysis. It emphasizes the fluidity and
multiplicity of legal consciousness and identities and eschews fixed categories or typologies.1
Legal consciousness and identity emerge from and shape one another. Thus, for the Identity
school, the place of law in people’s lives is intimately connected to their sense of who they are,
which is itself a product and producer of their worldview. Upon encountering new events,
individuals may regard law as irrelevant if their identity seems consonant with those events. That
being so, their perception makes the circumstances seem natural, and they are likely to decide
there is nothing for the law to fix. If, however, events appear incongruent with their identity,
individuals may perceive the circumstances as unfair and decide to take legal action. Such
actions, of course, include not only the official use of legal institutions but also the verbal threat
to claim one’s rights, or the use of legal terms or concepts in everyday discourse, or even the
influence of inarticulate thought processes that are shaped by legal norms.
A representative work of the Identity school by Engel & Munger (2003) highlights the
1

Some identities are externally imposed, whereas others are internally created self-conceptions.

As Goffman (1963) on “spoiled identities” suggests, the two are inseparable and mutually
constructed.
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mutually constitutive relationship between legal consciousness and identity in adults with
disabilities. Told through life story narratives, legal consciousness for these men and women was
very much a matter of identity construction rather than the instrumental deployment of rights.
Their interviewees never brought legal claims and seldom consulted lawyers, even though
virtually all of them felt they had been treated unfairly and their career prospects had been
damaged by discrimination. Although they worried that legal claims could irreparably harm the
identities to which they aspired, many of them also made it clear that law had become active in
their lives indirectly or constitutively—by altering their identities. Law had changed their
assumptions about who they were and where they belonged, and it had led them to imagine
careers that would have been unthinkable to a previous generation before the enactment of
disability rights legislation.
Because of its insights into the fluidity and multiplicity of identities and legal consciousness,
the Identity school of legal consciousness research exposes the paradoxical impact of legal
claiming on subordinated identities. To the marginalized, law may seem a double-edged sword;
as they assert legal rights based on an identity protected by the law to win acceptance and
inclusion, they find themselves constructing an identity that may actually be stigmatized and
oppositional (Minow 1990).2 A brilliant example is Hartog’s (1995) historical account of an
eighteenth-century American woman named Abigail Bailey. Bailey’s husband attacked her and
raped their teenaged daughter. As a married woman subject to the eighteenth-century legal
doctrine of coverture, Bailey’s identity was covered by that of another—her brutal husband.
Bailey’s thoughts and actions owed a great deal to her religious self-conception, but the law did
play a critical role. At the same time that law shaped her identity as a disempowered and often
submissive woman, it also offered access to powerful avenues of resistance. In the end, when
Bailey used the law to attain freedom for herself and her children, she overcame the restrictions
imposed by the legal doctrine of coverture, but she also reinscribed her identity, not as a free and
independent woman but as an obedient and subordinate subject. To abide by the legal definition
of a good wife, Bailey had no choice but to seek a separation or else be deemed complicit in her
husband’s illegal acts.

2

Although Minow (1990) does not focus explicitly on the topic of legal consciousness, she raises

issues that have proved highly influential for scholars of the Identity school.
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Recent studies in the Identity school have proved consistent with these earlier works.
Kirkland (2008) shows how the social identity of fat people paradoxically makes legal claims of
discrimination both inviting and risky. Kirkland’s interviewees did not consider legal action to
combat unfair treatment on the job and instead worked hard at identity construction. Some of
them conceptualized their mistreatment through the terminology of antidiscrimination law,
adopting what Kirkland calls “rights discourse,” but recognized that legal protections for fat
people are weak. In any case, they preferred not to pursue any strategy that would characterize
them as abnormal or “disabled.” In Abrego’s (2008) study of undocumented immigrant students
following the enactment of California Assembly Bill 540, which exempted them from paying
nonresident tuition for higher education, the interviewees viewed law as both oppressive and
liberating. Immigration laws and their enforcement contributed to an identity that made the
students seem alien and threatening. However, these same laws also offered protections and
opportunities, such as access to higher education without a requirement that the students
categorize themselves in stigmatizing terms. In this sense, the law strengthened their identities as
educated professionals even as it marginalized them.3
Many other legal consciousness studies could be categorized in the Identity school as we
have defined it. Furthermore, it is no exaggeration to say that virtually every study of legal
consciousness has implications for identity, because law is invoked only by those who possess an
identity that makes them perceive law to be relevant to their circumstances. Furthermore, every
decision to invoke law has an impact on the identity of those who claim it. The mutually
constitutive effects of law and identity are therefore relevant to the entire field of legal
consciousness research, yet we shall see that other concerns become much more prominent for
scholars whom we categorize in the remaining two schools.
Hegemony.
The Hegemony school views law as a pervasive and powerful instrument of state control that
shapes the worldviews, perceptions, and decisions of individuals, even when it is not applied
3

Although Abrego (2008) draws rather positive conclusions about the beneficial effects of one

particular law, her research on the whole fits well within the Identity school. It demonstrates the
mutually constitutive effects of law and identity formation, and it reminds us that law remains a
highly variable factor in relation to identity.
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directly or instrumentally. For most proponents of the Hegemony school, the purpose of legal
consciousness research is to reveal the workings and expose the far-reaching yet often invisible
effects of law in the thoughts and actions of ordinary people. At the same time, many Hegemony
scholars seek to reveal how some individuals resist law’s powerful effects, albeit in ways that
reinforce or leave intact law’s superordinate power. Although subjectivity of the individual is
important, it is not itself the explanandum but serves primarily to reveal the effects of legal
power.
The pervasive and unquestioned nature of law’s power appears prominently in the Hegemony
school’s most representative works. For the welfare recipients Sarat (1990, pp. 345–46) studied,
law was “all over,” a “shadowy presence” of “power and of compulsion.” In terms of the three
elements by which we have defined legal consciousness, law imposed a subordinated worldview
for welfare recipients that dictated their bleak perceptions about life’s most pressing needs and
constrained decisions about personal and private aspects of their lives. Ewick & Silbey’s (1998,
p. 247) survey subjects also viewed the law as a “durable and powerful” presence in everyday
life, but not because it invariably required obedience to its commands. Rather, law achieved
hegemony by being constantly produced and reproduced in the “common place” thoughts and
actions of ordinary people. To put it in the terminology we have proposed, Ewick & Silbey
suggest that these interviewees perceived events and made decisions in response to them in
different ways. Some perceived the law as “majestic,” whereas others viewed it as “a game” or
attempted to go “against” it. Their decisions varied according to these differing perceptions, and
their worldviews evolved as a result of their life experiences. Nonetheless, law continuously
penetrated and pervaded their lives. No matter how they responded, they could not help but
sustain law’s hegemonic power over social life and reinforce its authority and control. In a prior
study of working-class Americans in New England, Merry (1990)—unlike Sarat (1990) and
Ewick & Silbey (1998)—focused on litigation rather than problems that did not necessarily come
to the attention of legal professionals, but she reached similar conclusions. Merry, too,
highlighted the extent to which law exerted control over the perceptions of issues and the
decisions people made in response to them. Her interviewees came to court believing they were
entitled to its protection, but court officials often reinterpreted their neighborhood and family
problems as “garbage cases” and offered nonlegal solutions, denying them the protection they
expected the legal system to provide (180; see also Yngvesson 1993). As a result, their
7

experiences with the courts altered their worldviews and perceptions of themselves and their
problems.
According to the Hegemony school, even when individuals engage in counter-hegemonic
acts of resistance and go “against the law” (Ewick & Silbey 1998), they cannot overcome law’s
inescapable, constitutive reach into social life. A few welfare recipients in Sarat’s (1990) study
did resist the law by seeking legal assistance; however, the Hegemony school would argue that
they failed to displace law’s hegemonic status. Such acts of resistance bring brief reprieves and
small victories but ultimately sustain law’s power (Silbey 2005). This is because, consistent with
the concepts of “tactical resistance” (Sarat 1990 and Ewick & Silbey 1998, citing de Certeau
1984) and disciplinary power (Ewick & Silbey 1998, citing Foucault 1980), resistance operates
between law’s cracks and thus within its logic and understandings, rather than outside its
framework. Even as they attempt to resist, these individuals “ultimately reproduce state law’s
legitimacy and power” (Wilson 2011, p. 481).
Although Ewick & Silbey’s intellectual motivation was to expose the hegemonic power of
law (see Silbey 2005), many legal consciousness studies in the Hegemony school have placed
primary emphasis on elucidating tactics of resistance (see, e.g., Gilliom 2001). Kostiner (2003)
explores the counter-hegemonic possibilities of resistance against law among social justice
activists in the San Francisco Bay Area and concludes that social change may be possible despite
law’s hegemony if activists adopt primarily nonlegal strategies. Fritsvold (2009) takes the
analysis of resistance even further. To the radical environmentalists in his study, law is a
hegemonic power to be challenged in toto for protecting an illegitimate social order. Carrying
out civil disobedience and deliberately breaking the law, they do more than mount covert
resistance. Because these activists go beyond the form of legal consciousness Ewick & Silbey
describe as “against the law,” Fritsvold offers “under the law” as a fourth addition to their three
schemas.
Mobilization.
Members of what we call the Mobilization school study legal consciousness to understand law’s
potential for transforming society, particularly by deploying rights that are intended to achieve
justice or protect disadvantaged populations. Some Mobilization scholars study the legal
consciousness of individuals or groups to gauge the extent of social change that has occurred,
whereas others study it to explain the dynamic cognitive processes that lead people to bring
8

about change. In either case, studying legal consciousness helps Mobilization scholars to view
social change through the lens of human agency, thereby augmenting the more typical research
on social change that tends to adopt an aggregate and distanced perspective.
Among Mobilization scholars who study individual legal consciousness to measure the
extent of law’s impact on social change, some highlight the role of local norms and practices in
constraining people’s invocation of law. To put the matter in the definitional terms we have
proposed, these researchers show how local norms and practices limit law’s potential influence
on social change by shaping the worldviews of individuals such that they do not perceive law as
helpful or relevant, or they decide to avoid the law when dealing with problems in their lives.
Gallagher (2006, 2017), for example, analyzed the limited impact of China’s state-led “rule of
law” project by examining the legal consciousness of laborers, who resorted to strikes and
violence when they realized that labor law and access to state justice conformed to existing
market inequalities. Similarly, Albiston (2010) found, on the one hand, that by redefining the
social meaning of family and medical leave, a new civil rights statute reshaped the worldviews of
workers so that they came to perceive their employers’ refusal to grant time off as a legal wrong.
On the other hand, workplace rules and norms, management control over time, and cultural
assumptions about disabilities reduced the likelihood that the workers would decide to respond to
the wrong by filing formal claims. Likewise, Marshall (2005) found that office grievance
procedures limited the likelihood that employees would turn to the law to fight against sexual
harassment.
Other scholars examine how identity and social position shape the worldviews of their
research subjects, influence their perceptions of issues, and consequently determine whether they
decide to mobilize their rights in response. For example, Nielsen (2000) shows that men, women,
and ethnic minorities differ in their propensity to demand legal protection from offensive public
speech. Boittin (2013) explores Chinese sex workers’ diverse ways of dealing with abuse and
uses legal consciousness analysis to explain why most of them decided not to use the law.
Abrego (2011) finds that the age at which undocumented immigrants arrived in the United States
and were socialized at work and school affected their identities, leading to differences in their
readiness to mobilize the law to solve their problems.
In the Mobilization school, law typically looms as a powerful presence—as in studies by the
Hegemony school—but human agency receives more attention and is generally portrayed as less
9

constrained by law. The researchers’ central concern is not to document law’s dominance but to
explore the circumstances under which people deploy the law to protect their interests, and thus
to better understand law’s potential contribution to positive change. Hernández (2010) observes
that it is possible for disadvantaged individuals—low-incomes mothers, in her case—to gain
legal knowledge, transform their self-identities, perceive themselves as legally entitled, and
mobilize the law, rather than cynically shun or dismiss it. In Hull’s (2003) study asking whether
same-sex couples desire legal recognition for their relationships, her interviewees enact legality
in the absence of official law. Hull argues that these findings challenge the idea that marginalized
social actors tend to possess resistant legal consciousness and evade law in their everyday lives.
Instead, by adopting marriage-related terminology and performing public commitment rituals,
same-sex couples embrace law’s power to change cultural discourse and meanings—a claim that
resonates with later studies on the legal consciousness of gays and lesbians after legally
recognized same-sex marriage in the United States became widely available (see, e.g., Richman
2014).
For Mobilization researchers who study legal consciousness to explain the thoughts and
actions of those who fight for social change, the primary aim is to examine at close range how
human agency interacts with rights to facilitate, hamper, or otherwise influence their efforts. To
put it in our definitional terms, they ask whether and how people draw from rights discourse in
their perceptions and decisions—to help them make sense of troublesome events or decide on
responses to them. McCann (1994), an early representative of this line of research, asked union
and feminist activists how they used rights’ symbolic and strategic power and mobilized working
women to fight for equal pay, even when the courts failed to endorse their formal legal claims. In
studies of legal consciousness in the disability rights movement, Vanhala (2011) and Heyer
(2015) highlight the various ways in which activists reinterpret rights to expand and enrich the
scope of equality protected by state law. Chua (2015, 2019) analyzes how Burmese LGBT
(lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) activists creatively infuse international human rights
with local understandings about karma, social roles, and responsibility to make human rights
meaningful to fellow Burmese and appeal to them to join the movement.
Although their research subjects do not necessarily favor legal strategies or claiming for
rights, Mobilization school researchers nevertheless focus on actors’ perceptions and decisions
about the relevance of rights as solutions to their problems. These researchers use legal
10

consciousness analysis to reveal the limits and potential of rights for collective action and social
change (see, e.g., Aviram 2008; Chua 2012, 2014; Levitsky 2008, 2014).4 Legal consciousness
analysis enables them to explain how rights can influence the course of social change even in the
absence of explicit claims.

TURBULENCE: THE DEATH AND CONTINUING LIFE OF LEGAL
CONSCIOUSNESS RESEARCH
The report of my death was an exaggeration.
—Mark Twain5
By the early 2000s, the field of legal consciousness research experienced turbulence. On the one
hand, a few scholars began to question the paradigm itself, suggesting that it might have
exhausted its potential and that researchers should move on. On the other hand, legal
consciousness scholarship continued to grow, indicating that it had not hit a dead end. Scholars
from all three schools, particularly those who focused on understudied populations in a variety of
social settings, increasingly found the research paradigm of legal consciousness to be valuable.
The period of self-questioning was punctuated by an essay Susan Silbey published in this
journal in 2005. Silbey (2005, p. 358) urged researchers to redirect legal consciousness studies
“to recapture the critical sociological project of explaining the durability and ideological power
of law.” She expressed concern that the field had lost its “critical edge and theoretical utility” (p.
324), “leaving us with studies of individual psychology and its accommodations to predefined
policy goals” (p. 359). The very title of her critique, “After Legal Consciousness,” suggested that
the moment for this type of research may have passed.
Silbey’s carefully argued critique is grounded primarily in the Hegemony school. Legal
consciousness research, she contends, is meant “to address issues of legal hegemony, particularly
how the law sustains its institutional power despite a persistent gap between the law on the books
and the law in action” (p. 323). Specifically, this type of research aims to reveal why people
“acquiesce” to a legal system that disadvantages and disempowers them (p. 323). Documenting
4

Neither Levitsky (2008, 2014) nor Chua (2012, 2014) used the term legal consciousness

explicitly to describe their work.
5

http://www.thisdayinquotes.com/2010/06/reports-of-my-death-are-greatly.html.
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individual cases of subjectivity, in her view, has value only to the extent that researchers use
them to expose the less accessible, hegemonic forces of cultural production, which infuse
everyday life with ideas, values, and images that constrain action and reproduce inequality.
Because legal consciousness research did not atrophy but flourished in the years following
publication of Silbey’s essay, however, her criticisms may have seemed less salient to
researchers in the Identity or Mobilization schools. Two years before the publication of Silbey’s
essay, Marshall & Barclay (2003) offered a more sanguine and rather different survey,
contending that legal consciousness studies remain useful for understanding how individual
subjectivity mobilizes legal norms and institutions to mitigate injustice and produce greater
social equality. While sharing Silbey’s appreciation for law’s constitutive effects, they argued
that analysis of legal hegemony is not the sole or even the primary purpose of legal
consciousness research. Rather, they endorsed a focus on the agency of individual subjects, the
“zone of volition in which individuals make decisions about how law will shape their behavior”
(p. 623).
In a more recent response to the Silbey critique,6 Hull (2016) points out that scholars have
expanded legal consciousness as a research paradigm to marginalized groups to illuminate the
important and often positive effects of legal rights as well as the creativity and agency of
“ordinary” people. Hull focuses on LGBT-related studies, but her discussion of agency and the
strategic use of law among marginalized groups typifies recent legal consciousness research
among scholars who have turned their attention to such groups as undocumented immigrants
(Abrego 2011, 2018), sexual minorities (Connolly 2002, Harding 2011, Hull 2003, Richman
2014), racial minorities (Hirsh & Lyons 2010, Morrill et al. 2010), aboriginal populations
(Jacobs 2010, McMillan 2011), women (Boittin 2013, Liu 2018, Marshall 2005), workers
(Gallagher 2006, He et al. 2013, Hoffmann 2003, Nguyen 2018, Smith 2005), prisoners (Calavita
& Jenness 2014), peasants (Hudson 2001), and the poor (Hernández 2010, Huang et al. 2014).
In fact, legal consciousness studies now explore a broad range of social scientific questions
connected to several different research concerns and theories associated with a variety of
academic disciplines. A survey of all published books, articles, and chapters with the term legal

6

See also Hertogh (2018), presenting what he views as a European counterpoint to Ewick &
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consciousness in their titles during the past 35 years (Figure 1) suggests that the research
paradigm underwent dramatic growth during and after the period of turbulence in the early
2000s. Rather than exposing a conceptual flaw in their understanding of the concept of legal
consciousness, the diversity of approaches in these publications illustrates an important strength
of sociolegal studies as a field in which scholars share a commitment to examining the place of
law in social life but have varied intellectual motivations.

Figure 1
Legal consciousness in titles of scholarly publications. This figure was generated by
searching Google Scholar and WorldCat for all scholarly books, articles, and book chapters
published worldwide containing the expression “legal consciousness” in the title. Only
English-language publications were considered, and where the subject matter was
ambiguous from the title, each was read to ensure the accuracy of our classification.
Asterisk represents partial count as of March 2019.
The argument against a legal consciousness approach based only on the Hegemony school
draws support from the expansion of research conducted outside North America. Insisting on a
single theoretical orientation would be unrealistic, perhaps even harmful, for this transnational
dialogue. As Liu (2015, p. 6) suggests, sociolegal scholarship’s preoccupation with
“power/inequality”—which aligns with the motivations of the Hegemony school—is, “to a large
extent, a historical product of the progressive intellectual movements in the United States.”
Although this focus remains important for much of the American sociolegal research agenda, Liu
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contends, the revelation of law’s hegemony does not necessarily provide the most enlightening
or even relevant analytical tools in other societies. Of course, some legal consciousness studies
outside the United States do expose legal hegemony and its manifestations in neoliberal policies
(see, e.g., Santos 1995, Santos & Rodríguez-Garavito 2005), or examine subaltern resistance and
the use of subversive tactics to contest official law (see, e.g., Harding 2011, Ho & Chua 2016,
Smith 2005). Other non-American studies, however, are motivated by interests and issues more
pertinent to the Identity or Mobilization perspectives. Some examine how individuals, groups, or
societies organize themselves or manifest a sense of self (Hertogh & Kurkchiyan 2016,
Kurkchiyan 2011, Michelson 2008, Somanawat 2018, Tungnirun 2018, Khorakiwala 2018). Still
others explore the ways in which people interpret the law or use legal solutions to address
injustice and solve their grievances (Engel & Engel 2010, He et al. 2013, Hendley 2011, Hertogh
2009, Huang et al. 2014, Kubal 2015, Liu 2018, Moustafa 2013, Nguyen 2018).
In short, the proliferation of legal consciousness research in the United States and in a
growing number of other societies demonstrates that the field has reached not a dead end but a
major intersection. Critiques of the field in the early 2000s did promote essential self-reflection
that clarified differing research goals under the legal consciousness banner. Meanwhile, scholars
from diverse theoretical perspectives, disciplinary backgrounds, and methodological traditions
increasingly found legal consciousness to be a valuable research paradigm. They applied its basic
concepts and methods to social and cultural contexts and areas of law previously understudied by
sociolegal scholars, injecting new energy and insights into the field.

LOOKING AHEAD: RELATIONAL LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS
One of the most promising aspects of the growth of legal consciousness research is a trend
toward what we call relational legal consciousness. In this section, we discuss the expansion of
relational perspectives and the potential for future legal consciousness research that draws more
extensively on a relational model. We suggest that the relational turn in legal consciousness
research has implications for all three of the components we have emphasized throughout this
article—worldview, perspective, and decision.
The Emergence of Relational Legal Consciousness
Of course, no legal consciousness researcher has ever asserted that individual consciousness
14

arises in a social vacuum. To varying degrees, all sociolegal scholars appreciate that humans are
social creatures, whose thoughts and actions inevitably reflect their interactions with other
individuals, groups, and institutions. In a sense, then, all legal consciousness research is and
always has been relational. The recent growth of relational perspectives has been a matter of
degree rather than kind. Variations in contemporary legal consciousness research should
therefore be imagined on a continuum ranging from highly individualistic and autonomous
conceptualizations of thought and action on one end to highly interactive and co-constitutive
conceptualizations on the other (compare Crossley 2011, von Benda-Beckmann 2018).
Although concepts of the self as essentially atomistic and autonomous are typically
associated with Enlightenment theory of the eighteenth century, the relational perspective on
individual consciousness is also apparent in the writings of theorists reaching back at least as far
as the nineteenth century if not beyond. For example, the early writings of Marx (1975, pp. 328–
29) suggested that both worldview and perception in working-class consciousness were
relational in nature, emerging from workers’ positions vis-à-vis capitalists (Held 2009, Roelvink
2013, Wartenberg 1982). Near the end of the nineteenth century, Durkheim [1964 (1893)]
proposed a relational form of worldview in his concept of a “conscience collective,” referring to
a set of shared moral beliefs that regulate the thoughts and actions of the members of a society.
At about the same time, another theorist, James [1952 (1891), p. 189, emphasis in original],
suggested that perception and decision are shaped by one’s social relationships—consciousness
is fundamentally relational, and in fact, each individual has “as many social selves as there are
individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind.” In sum, ideas
associated with the Enlightenment notwithstanding, theories of consciousness have always
featured competing viewpoints ranging from the individualistic to the relational.
In the late twentieth century, the relational perspective attracted growing attention among
Western scholars across the disciplines. Psychologist Gergen (2009, p. 397), for example,
emphasizes that individuals do not create meaning one-by-one but construct it by “coordinated
action” as relational beings through their communication and interaction with one another.
Sociologist Emirbayer (1997, p. 287), in his “Manifesto for a Relational Sociology,” rejects the
bounded condition of the “person” and instead portrays individuals as “inseparable from the
transactional contexts within which they are embedded.” Relational theory also featured
prominently in the work of some feminist legal scholars. Fineman (2008, 2018), for example,
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suggests that all humans are interdependent, “vulnerable,” and essentially interconnected; and
Nedelsky (2011, p. 19) argues that human subjects of law and government are not freestanding
individuals but are “constituted by networks of relationships of which they are a part” (also see
Harding 2017).
Furthermore, a more relational approach to legal consciousness has been evident in recent
sociolegal research conducted in Asia, Africa, and other settings outside Europe and North
America, where the influence of Enlightenment philosophy was uneven and popular
understandings of atomistic individualism had shallow roots, if they existed at all. In those
settings, legal consciousness researchers have discovered that worldviews, perceptions, and
decisions develop relationally, and it is often impossible to disentangle the consciousness of any
one person from those of her family members, fellow villagers, or other intimate associates. As
Morreira (2016, p. 129) concluded in her study of human rights in Zimbabwe, “One is not a
person without the intricate connections one holds to other people” [see also Tanabe 2002, p. 48
and Fei 1992 (1947) as discussed in Ng & He 2017]. If the self is essentially relational, it follows
that an overly individualistic framework will fail to capture the essence of her legal
consciousness.
The concept of relational legal consciousness that emerges from these studies in non-Western
societies should not, however, be romanticized. To the extent that individual personhood is
subsumed within other social relationships, there is a possibility that these relationships are
unequal and maintain existing social hierarchies. Certain forms of relational consciousness may
normalize the plight of an abused spouse or an exploited laborer (McCann 2017, citing Merry
2003). Nevertheless, some legal consciousness researchers have found that people may
effectively mobilize the law because of their relational bonds, not despite them. For example,
legal activism among queer Burmese took root after they were invited to join the nascent LGBT
rights movement by people whom they knew or trusted, and many of them stayed on because of
relationships they subsequently formed with fellow activists (Chua 2019). Likewise, Feldman
(2000) suggests that, although members of Japanese society are generally reluctant to assert their
rights as individuals, they may be willing to mobilize rights collectively, if enough people band
together relationally as a group with similar concerns.
The Relational Legal Consciousness Continuum
Earlier, we suggested that relational perspectives in the existing literature on legal consciousness
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could be arranged along a continuum from the most individualistic conceptions to the most
relational. At one end of the continuum are legal consciousness studies that view the self as
essentially autonomous and independent, not entirely divorced from social relationships yet
functioning primarily on its own in terms of the worldview–perception–decision making
components of thought and action that we have discussed above. Studies in this region of the
continuum regard the individual mind as the locus of legal consciousness and assume that
researchers should adopt one-by-one or person-by-person methodologies rather than attempting
to study the co-constitutive genesis of consciousness in the interactions of two or more minds. To
the extent that these researchers consider the influence of other persons or social factors, they
regard them as independent variables in relation to the dependent variable of individual
worldviews, perceptions, and decisions.
Many studies from the Mobilization school are located in this individualistic region of the
continuum, as they analyze how each of their research subjects decides to invoke or avoid law.
Often enough, these researchers do consider the influence of interpersonal relationships, but they
tend to view such relationships as external to—yet impinging on—the individual’s legal
consciousness. For example, Morgan (1999) examines how familial ties affect women’s
decisions to sue for sexual harassment; Merry (2003) shows that the influence of social workers,
lawyers, and activists can affect perceptions and decisions to invoke legal resources by women
experiencing domestic violence; and Gallagher (2006) and McCann (1994) show that similar
interactions with professionals can increase the propensity of Chinese and American workers,
respectively, to mobilize their rights.
For researchers affiliated with the Hegemony school, relational concerns are largely implicit
in their work, and many can be placed in this individualistic region of the continuum as well.
Their studies assume that law’s controls and constraints as well as its disempowering ideologies
are experienced and reproduced person by person through relationships with external others—
government officials and institutions, police, lawyers, judges, and bureaucrats, as well as people
and groups to whom individuals may have ties (see, e.g., Ewick & Silbey 1992, Gilliom 2001).
Through the use of case studies, other Hegemony scholars scrutinize how gender, race, ethnicity,
and other potentially subordinating attributes influence individuals’ relationships, and thus their
worldviews, perceptions, and decisions (see, e.g., Nielsen 2000). Yet the tendency, particularly
in the earlier legal consciousness studies, was to operationalize these factors as external
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influences on individual thoughts and actions.
Among researchers who analyze legal consciousness individualistically, some highlight
power-laden relationships to show how hierarchies and inequalities constrain and control
individuals’ interactions with other people, groups, and institutions. For instance, Li (2016)
considers how the decisions of rural Chinese lawyers to mobilize the law on behalf of their
clients are affected by the lawyers’ connections with clients, adversaries, and surrounding
communities. What Li terms the “relational embeddedness” of these lawyers sheds light on the
systemic subordination of rural Chinese, such as indigent elders, divorced women, and villagers,
who are in weaker social positions outside the small circle of local elites. Similarly, Liu &
Halliday (2017, p. xii) study politically liberal lawyers in China and conclude that they may be
unable to mobilize for social change because they “are not simply individual lawyers floating
like professional flotsam on a sea of social and political turbulence” but are constrained by their
institutional or personal ties with state agencies or officials. Both of these studies view external
hierarchies and unequal power relationships as powerful influences on the individual legal
consciousness of legal professionals in China.
Moving toward the middle region of the individualistic/relational continuum, we find legal
consciousness studies that retain the individual as the appropriate object of study but treat other
individuals as co-creators of consciousness rather than mere external variables. Studies in this
region of the continuum, moreover, place a greater emphasis on the porosity of boundaries
between individual cognition and relationships with others. Identity school studies, such as that
by Engel & Munger (2003), feature individuals’ legal consciousness and their relationships as
intertwined in mutually constitutive processes. Because the sense of self is “distributed” across a
network of significant others, legal consciousness shifts and morphs as people engage in these
important relationships and, in so doing, manifest different aspects of their identities (Engel &
Munger 2003, citing Bruner 1990). Thus, exploring why tort victims do not mobilize the law and
sue their injurers, Engel (2016, p. 154) explains that humans “make decisions as part of their
social network, even when they act without explicit direction…Human identity isn’t formed in
solitude. We are our relationships.” Similarly, in Merry’s (2003) study of abused women in Hilo,
Hawaii, the emergence of a more law-oriented form of consciousness came as the women shifted
their subjectivities from relationships to kin, family, and work to relationships with state actors.
With these shifts came an increased tendency for the women to view themselves as rights
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subjects.
Studies in this region of the continuum tend to place greater emphasis on group membership
as a critically important factor in shaping legal consciousness, not only because group norms are
widely shared but because maintaining one’s standing in the group is itself a primary motivation.
As Nadler (2017, p. 60) observes, “The way in which people interact with law is mediated by
group life.” In her view,
To talk about how law influences individual behavior in a vacuum, devoid of
social context, is to ignore the ways that group identity interacts with law to
provide motivations to comply. These include motives to cooperate, to be loyal to
the group, to adhere to group norms, and to avoid social exclusion. (Nadler 2017,
p. 70, citations omitted)
Some Identity school studies in the continuum’s middle region emphasize that individual
legal consciousness is inextricable from the meaning-making activities of a group. Rather than
taking the group or community as a given, they show that individuals can actually create
community with their legal consciousness as much as the community creates their legal
consciousness and sense of self. For example, Tungnirun (2018) finds that foreign corporate
lawyers construct two different communities with their divergent understandings of law in
Myanmar—one that assimilates with native lawyers and another that carries a sense of legal
superiority and sets itself apart. Tungnirun calls these “communities of meaning,” making use of
a term coined by Engel (1998, referring to Greenhouse 1988 and Yngvesson 1988). In such
research, people participating in ongoing relationships produce a legal consciousness that
sustains their community and bestows membership on those identified as insiders, who share
assumptions about the appropriate use and nonuse of law.
Finally, at the other end of the continuum, is a concept of relationalism that rejects the
individual as the unit of analysis and views legal consciousness as a fully collaborative
phenomenon. In this perspective, legal consciousness is not formulated person by person but is
constituted by their very relationships and exists among and between individual minds rather
than within them. This type of legal consciousness can take on as many different forms as there
are relationships—among couples, families, groups, associations, communities, and so on.
Because individuals have multiple relationships, they participate in—and help to constitute—
multiple forms of collective legal consciousness.
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The co-constitutive model of legal consciousness reflects a well-established tradition of
social theory. For example, Merleau-Ponty [2012 (1945), p. 370] theorized a form of
consciousness arising in its totality from dialogue with another, a “being-shared-by-two” in
which “we are, for each other, collaborators in perfect reciprocity: our perspectives slip into each
other, we coexist through a single world.” Contemporary practice theorists, such as Bourdieu
(1977), postulate what Warde (2016, p. 42) calls “integrative practice,” which functions at the
level of the “supraindividual” and exists on its own terms and “for itself.” The life experiences of
individuals are associated with collective forms of legal consciousness that transcend the
thoughts and actions of any single person.7
Although legal consciousness scholars have not fully theorized a purely co-constitutive
model, some recent writings seem to venture in this direction. For example, Young (2014)
postulates a “second-order legal consciousness” that transcends individualized models and
resides outside any single person. She suggests that “a person’s beliefs about, and attitude
toward, a particular law or set of laws is influenced not only by his own experience, but by his
understanding of others’ experiences with, and beliefs about, the law” (p. 500; see discussion of
Young’s analysis in Hull 2016). Abrego (2018), in her discussion of the effects of Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) in the United States, also implies that legal
consciousness can exist at a collective level. Although DACA targeted undocumented
immigrants as individuals, Abrego (2018, p. 204, emphasis added) finds that its benefits enabled
families of DACA recipients to “move away from a family legal consciousness based on
infantilizing experiences when they had to rely on favors from others to meet basic family needs,
to a legal consciousness of family independence through interdependence on DACA recipients.”8
Because the co-constitutive region of the relational legal consciousness continuum has not
been fully theorized, some critically important questions still await analysis. It is not clear
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Nadler (2017) claims that law interacts directly with a group to shape its norms and values, and

thus “group identity” influences individuals’ thoughts and actions. This raises questions, which
are not explicitly addressed in her article, about how group identity develops, how a “group”
interacts with law, and how a group-level type of legal consciousness takes shape as a result.
20

whether all legal consciousness is to be deemed relational or just some types, nor is it obvious
how some participants in a relationship adopt features of collective legal consciousness but
others do not. The co-constitutive process itself has not been described and documented, nor
have the dynamics between individual legal consciousness (if any) and the collective form.
Should we now imagine relational legal consciousness to be something like a computer cloud
storage shared by multiple users? Do individuals download relevant contents from the cloud as
they perceive their experiences and make decisions in response? Do they upload new or modified
contents to the cloud?
In the most extreme form of a co-constitutive model, individual subjectivity might fade
completely into relationships, and researchers might abandon the individual entirely as the
relevant unit of analysis. Instead, they would treat dynamic relations as the proper object of
inquiry (Emirbayer 1997, Liang & Liu 2018) and would therefore view legal consciousness as
existing only as part of the relationships among two or more people. If such a view were fully
adopted, a significant modification in research methodology would be required. The person-byperson research methods used by legal consciousness scholars from the early 1980s to the
present could become irrelevant. Instead, researchers would need to devise new approaches that
focus on the observation and analysis of relationships and social interactions to determine how
different forms of legal consciousness arise from the dialogic process that produces MerleauPonty’s [2012 (1945), p. 370] “being-shared-by-two.” What those methodologies might look
like, and how they might be operationalized, is not yet apparent.

CONCLUSION
From the early 1980s to the present, legal consciousness research has provided sociolegal
scholars with new insights into the mutually constitutive relationships among legal practices; the
worldviews, perspectives, and decisions of individual actors and groups; and the broader social
and cultural contexts in which they live. For Identity, Hegemony, and Mobilization scholars, it
has illuminated the connections among law and conceptions of the self; it has revealed the often
hidden operations of power, inequality, and oppression; and—at times—it has highlighted the
capacity of law to change lives for the better even when it is not directly invoked or used
instrumentally. Legal consciousness research is thus a flexible paradigm capable of different
kinds of applications in the hands of researchers with different goals and perspectives.
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On the whole, legal consciousness researchers have resisted a singular, monolithic approach.
Emerging from a period of questioning and self-criticism at the turn of the twenty-first century,
the field has flourished and has remained one of the most active areas of sociolegal research. A
new generation of scholars has explored new directions in legal consciousness research, often
based on fieldwork in non-American settings as well as in marginalized communities and
peoples in the United States, and have contributed to insights across the three schools.
Growth in the field of legal consciousness has been accompanied by an increased attention to
its relational and co-constitutive aspects. The trend toward a less individualistic perspective is
partly a result of influence from relational theory across the academic disciplines and partly a
product of sociolegal research conducted in cultural contexts where Enlightenment philosophies
of the self are less firmly rooted. We have suggested that legal consciousness research in all three
schools can be arranged along an individualistic–relational continuum, although the more purely
relational—or co-constitutive—conceptions of legal consciousness are the most speculative and
least developed, at least for now.
We anticipate that future researchers will take on the questions and challenges involved in
highly relational approaches of legal consciousness study—in Western as well as in non-Western
settings, where individualistic approaches have proved to be particularly ill-suited. Increased
attention to relational legal consciousness has the potential to reshape all three schools, leading
to formulations of new questions, research designs, and theories about when and how law
becomes active. In short, relational legal consciousness represents a promising development for
the cultural turn that has enriched sociolegal scholarship for the past several decades and could
ensure the continued vitality of legal consciousness as a research paradigm for many years to
come.
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